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INTRODUCTION

Under North Carolina's Workers' Compensation system, an injured
employee is "disabled" if a compensable, work related injury causes him a
loss in earning power.1 A "disabled" employee will receive a percentage of
his weekly wage from his employer to compensate him for his disability.'
However, the employee is required to seek and obtain suitable alternative
employment, thereby relieving the employer of any further duty to pay
compensation to an employee who is no longer working.3 If the employee
cannot find suitable alternative employment based on his skills and
education, then he may be afforded vocational rehabilitation services.
Vocational rehabilitation services traditionally have involved job-seeking
assistance and sometimes skills training.4 Recently, North Carolina
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(9) (2003); Hendrix v. Linn-Corriher Corp., 317 N.C. 179, 186,
345 S.E.2d 374, 378 (1986).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-9, § 97-29 and § 97-30; see infra Section I; see also Little v.
Anson County Sch. Food Serv., 295 N.C. 527, 533, 246 S.E.2d 743, 747 (1978) (holding that the
employee did not have to show total physical incapacitation to receive benefits).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-18.1.
See infra Section I (defining suitable alternative
employment).
4. "Specific vocational rehabilitation services may include, but are not limited to:
vocational assessment, vocational exploration, counseling, job analysis, job modification, job
development and placement, labor market survey, vocational or psychometric testing, analysis of
transferable skills, work adjustment counseling, job-seeking skills training, on-the-job training
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employees have begun to consider formal education as part of vocational
rehabilitation.'
Traditional vocational rehabilitation services may be inadequate in
returning some employees to work. For example, in Smith v. Winn-Dixie,
Inc.,6 Smith was injured while working as a truck driver for Winn-Dixie.7
After the injury, Smith, who had worked as a truck driver for twenty-five
years, was restricted to working only in sedentary positions due to a 30
percent permanent partial impairment to his back.8 Unfortunately, Smith
only had a fourth grade education and was functionally illiterate.9 The
North Carolina Industrial Commission ("the Commission") found that
Smith, "based upon the cumulative effect of his advanced age, limited
education, lack of work skills transferable to sedentary work, and his
medical limitations," was unable to earn any wages.'" If Smith were to
return to gainful employment, he would have to be retrained for a sedentary
position."1 For an illiterate employee, education may be a necessary part of
an employee's retraining.'"
The need for education is particularly clear in North Carolina. Like
Smith, almost 50 percent of the general population has no education
beyond high school. 3 Further, within the last decade, North Carolina has
seen a shift in the job market as its economy has become more service
oriented and less manufacturing oriented. 4 Between 1995 and 2000,
and retraining, and follow-up after re-employment." Application of the Rules, N.C. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 4, r. 10C.0103 (June 2000). See also Gayton v. Gage Carolina Metals, Inc., 149 N.C.
App. 346, 350, 560 S.E.2d 870, 873 (2002). The additional cost of vocational training may be
well worth it to the employer, because once the employee returns to gainful employment the
employer will be relieved of the obligation to pay further benefits.
5. See infra Section I (discussing Russos v. Wheaton Indus. and Fosterv. U.S. Airways).
6. Vernon Smith, N.C. Indus. Comm'n No. 082639 (March 31, 2003) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review). All North Carolina Industrial Commission decisions referenced in
this article can be accessed by visiting the North Carolina Industrial Commission Searchable
Databases online at http://www.comp.state.nc.us /ncic/pages/database.htm.
7. Id.
8. Id. Due to his back injury, Smith would frequently drop things due to numbness in his
arms, and his legs would often give out from under him, preventing him from working in any
manual labor position. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See id. (stating that even a position as a shipping and receiving clerk, recommended by
the employer's rehabilitation counselor, involved too much physical exertion).
12. Unfortunately, in Smith, the Commission pointed out that even education would be futile
because the plaintiff was nearing retirement age (stating that the "[p]laintiff is not getting any
younger, and his continued aging is consequently a permanent condition."). Id.
13. N.C. Rural Econ. Dev. Ctr., Inc., Rural Databank, at http://www.ncruralcenter.org/
databank/datasheet.asp?topic=Education (last visited August 17, 2004) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review). Of the total N.C. population, 28.4 percent have a high school diploma
and 21.9 percent never completed high school. Id.
14. N.C. Rural Econ. Dev. Ctr., Inc., Choices, 19-20 (2000). The service economy includes
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manufacturing jobs declined 9.7 percent. 5 During that same time, several
other industries grew, including the service industry by 30 percent; retail
trade by 11.7 percent; construction by 32.7 percent; and finance, insurance,
and real estate by 25.8 percent.'16 In a state that historically has been
dependent on agriculture and manufacturing, injured employees who spend
entire careers in these industries may find it difficult to find replacement
positions as these industries continue to decline. 7 Even when such
positions are available, they are often too physically demanding for injured
employees, like Smith, to fulfill. Therefore, education may be the only
option for returning many North Carolinians to work.
North Carolina should allow injured employees to receive workers'
compensation for their education when the classroom is the only way for
them to return to the workforce. The challenge for the Commission and
courts is developing law in this area that balances the competing interests
of employer and employee. Specifically, the Commission and courts must
be cognizant of the financial burden that will be imposed on an employer
who is expected to fund an employee's education in addition to providing a
percentage of the employee's weekly wage.
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of workers'
compensation law in North Carolina and addresses the ways in which the
law regarding education benefits has developed. Part II analyzes education
benefits in the context of North Carolina statutory law and argues that
providing such benefits is consistent with the purpose of the workers'
compensation statute, so long as the employer's interest in limited liability
is taken into account. Accordingly, Part III offers recommendations
designed to balance the interests of employer and employee. These
recommendations, modeled on approaches taken in sister states, provide
guidelines for determining an employee's eligibility for education benefits,
the fields of study an employee is allowed to pursue when receiving such
benefits, the duration of an employer's liability for an employee's
education, education-related expenses for which an employer is liable, and
the reasonableness of an employee's proposed plan of rehabilitation
through education.

a broad category of occupations, "encompass[ing] everything from the local automotive repair
shop to the dentist office." Id. Higher paying positions, as is typical in health care service, and
low wage employment, such as cashiers and wait staff, are included within the service economy.
Id.
15. N.C. Dep't of Commerce, Policy, Research and Strategic Planning Div. N.C. Econ.
Review
(Sept.
2002)
2, available at http://cmedis.commerce.state.nc.us/econdata/
review/NCEconomicReview.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
16. Id.
17. See id.
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I. BACKGROUND ON WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND VOCATIONAL
REHABILITATION

At common law, workers could bring suit against their employers for
on-the-job injuries; however, such suits were not frequent.18 Employees
did not want to risk losing their jobs and employers were often protected
from liability under theories such as assumption of risk and contributory
negligence. 9 As industrial employment rose, and along with it the
prevalence of work related injuries, state legislatures began adopting
workers' compensation statutes to give employees additional protection.2 °
Such statutes provided an efficient method for handling claims, while
protecting both employer and employee.2"
In 1929, the North Carolina General Assembly adopted the state's
Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act").22 The Act provides exclusive
remedies to North Carolina employees for injuries "arising out of and in the
course of [their] employment."2 3
The North Carolina Industrial
Commission was created to administer the Act24 and is charged with
promulgating rules and regulations to implement the Act.
It also has
exclusive authority to adjudicate all issues between employers and
employees. 26 Any award decision of a commissioner is first subject to
review by the Full Commission27 and then by North Carolina appellate
courts 28
.

The purpose of the Act is to provide a fair and efficient system for
handling work related injuries." Itwas designed to benefit both employer
and employee. Though deprived of his common law remedy,3" the
employee is afforded compensation for his injuries and loss of earning

18. Joan T.A. Gabel, EscalatingInefficiency in Workers' CompensationSystems: Is Federal
Reform the Answer?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1083, 1086 (1999).
19. Id. Under the theory of contributory negligence, if the employee is found to be even
partially negligent in causing his own injury, then he will be denied any recovery. Miller v.
Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 237, 160 S.E.2d 65, 73 (1968).
20. Gabel, supra note 18, at 1086-87.
21. Id. at 1083-84.
22. Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 120, 1929 N.C. Pub. Laws 117 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 97-1 to -143 (2003)).
23. Id. § 97-3. The Act itself creates a presumption that all employers and employees come
within its ambit. Id.
24. Id. § 97-77.
25. Id. § 97-80.
26. Id. § 97-91.
27. Id. § 97-85.
28. Cooke v. Gillis, 218 N.C. 726, 728, 12 S.E.2d 250, 252 (1940).
29. Gabel, supra note 18, at 1083.
30. Brown v. Motor Inns of Carolina, Inc., 47 N.C. App. 115, 118, 266 S.E.2d 848, 849
(1980).
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power.3 Since the remedy provided under the Act is exclusive, the
employer is insulated from compensatory and punitive damages.32 The
employer's liability, as adjudged by the Commission or by a court, is
limited and determined.33
When an injury occurs the employee must report it to the employer
within thirty days.34 The employer may either accept or deny the
employee's claim.
If accepted, the parties enter into a compensation
agreement, which must then be approved by the Commission.36 If the
employer denies the claim,37 the employee may request a hearing of the
Commission.3"
The Commission then makes findings of fact and
conclusions of law and issues an award of compensation, if the employee is
eligible, that is binding on the employer.39 If the decision is appealed, the
Commission's findings of fact are binding. 4° The court's review is limited
31. Michael Doran, The Substantial Certainty Exception to Workers' Compensation, 17
CAMPBELL L. REV. 413, 413 (1995). The Act sets forth a compensation schedule for certain
types of injury. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31. For example, with the loss of an index finger an
employee is entitled to 66 2/3 percent of his average weekly wage for forty-five weeks. Id. A
thumb, however, is significantly more valuable. The injured employee would receive the same
compensation but for seventy-five weeks. Id.
32. See Branham v. Denny Roll & Panel Co., 223 N.C. 233, 236, 25 S.E.2d 865, 867 (1943)
(stating that the Act "provides no compensation for physical pain or discomfort [and
compensation] is limited to the loss of ability to earn").
33. Ruggery v. N.C. Dep't of Corr., 135 N.C. App. 270, 274, 520 S.E.2d 77, 81 (1999). The
Act defines the amount of compensation the employee will receive for many types of scheduled
injuries. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-29, -31. Alternatively, the Act also allows the employee to seek
compensation for partial disability, at a rate of 66 2/3 percent of the employee's weekly wage, for
up to 300 weeks. Id. § 97-30.
34. N.C. Indus. Comm'n Rules for Workers' Comp. Claims, Form 19, available at
http://www.comp.state.nc.us/ncic/pages/forml9.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review). The Industrial Commission provides standardized forms for employer and employee.
The employee or dependent reports the claim on a Form 18. N.C. Indus. Comm'n Rules for
Workers'
Comp.
Claims,
Form
18,
available at http://www.comp.state.nc.us/
ncic/pages/forml 8.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Use of these forms is
mandated by statute. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-82.
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-82. If the claim is allowed by the employer, the parties execute a
Form 21 agreement as to compensation. N.C. Indus. Comm'n Rules for Workers' Comp. Claims,
Form 21, available at http://www.comp.state.nc.us/ncic/ pages/form21 .pdf (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
36. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-82.
37. An employer's denial of a claim is accomplished via a Form 61. N.C. Indus. Comm'n
Rules for Workers' Comp. Claims, Form 61, available at http://www.co.mp.state.nc.us/
ncic/pages/form6 I.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
38. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-83. The employee must submit a Form 33 to the Commission to
receive a hearing. N.C. Indus. Comm'n Rules for Workers' Compensation Claims, Form 33,
availableat http://www.comp.state.nc.us/ncic/pages/form33 (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
39. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-86.
40. Id. As part of its findings of fact, the Commission will determine whether the employee
is capable of earning the same wages and whether the incapacity was caused by the injury. Grant
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to a determination of whether there is competent evidence to support the
award.4'
To receive workers' compensation benefits from the Commission, the
employee bears the burden of proving that he is disabled.42 Disability is not
synonymous with physical infirmity. In North Carolina, disability is
defined as "incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the
employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other
employment."43 Disability is not a medical question but rather is an
assessment of the employee's ability to earn income, including
consideration of vocational factors such as age, education, and training."
Disability can be proven in one of four ways: (1) evidence that, due to
the injury, the employee is incapable of working at any employment; (2)
evidence that the employee has been unsuccessful in finding employment
after a reasonable effort at a job search; (3) evidence that the employee is
employed but at lower wages; or (4) evidence that it would be futile for the
employee to seek work due to lack of education, experience, or other
factor.45 Once a disability is proven, it is presumed to continue until the
employee returns to suitable employment at wages comparable to those he
was receiving at the time his injury occurred.46
If the Commission determines that the employee is disabled, the
employer must then pay benefits pursuant to the award by the
Commission.47 To subsequently terminate benefits, the employer must
v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 77 N.C. App. 241, 247, 335 S.E.2d 327, 332 (1985). A finding that
earning power is reduced is tantamount to declaring the employee disabled and entitled to
benefits as a matter of fact. See id. This makes the Commission's finding extremely significant
and unlikely to be overturned on appeal. But see id. at 249, 335 S.E.2d at 333. (holding that the
evidence was inadequate to support the Commission's findings of fact that the plaintiff was able
to return to employment).
41. Franklin v. Broyhill Furniture Indus., 123 N.C. App. 200, 204, 472 S.E.2d 382, 385
(1996).
42. Russell v. Lowes Prod. Distrib., 108 N.C. App. 762, 765,425 S.E.2d 454,457 (1993). If
the injury is one of the scheduled injuries listed in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31, disability is
presumed. Grant, 77 N.C. App. at 250-51, 335 S.E.2d at 334.
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(9). The Supreme Court of North Carolina has recognized that
the employee may be disabled even when he is making a higher wage after the injury, if
employed in a position that is not available in a competitive market. Peoples v. Cone Mills Corp.,
316 N.C. 426, 437, 342 S.E.2d 798, 805-06 (1986).
44. Hilliard v. Apex Cabinet Co., 305 N.C. 593, 596, 290 S.E.2d 682, 684 (1982). Further,
rehabilitation of the disability is not limited to the employee's physical recovery, but rather
rehabilitation refers to regained earning power. See Russos v. Wheaton Indus., 145 N.C. App.
164, 168, 551 S.E.2d 456, 459 (2001) (holding that a finding that the employee has reached
maximum medical improvement does not alone indicate that the employee's disability has been
rehabilitated).
45. Russell, 108 N.C. App.at 765, 425 S.E.2d at 457.
46. Termination of Compensation, N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, r. 10A.0404 (June 2000).
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-18. The employer may also pay benefits pursuant to an agreement
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rebut the presumption of continuing disability.48 Since disability is based
on earning capacity, the employer must show that the employee is capable
of working at a job with comparable wages but has unjustifiably refused
such suitable alternative employment.49 If the employee refuses suitable
alternative employment, he forfeits any further benefits.5 0
However, in some circumstances, no suitable alternative employment
is available.
Factors such as "age, education, physical limitations,
vocational skills, and experience" are relevant to a determination of
suitableness." Courts have further found that "make-work" does not
constitute suitable alternative employment.52 "Make-work" is defined as a
job that has been modified by the employer to suit the injured employee's
physical capabilities, one that would not ordinarily be available in the
marketplace. 3
"Make-work" is not considered suitable alternative
employment nor is it indicative of the employee's actual earning power.54
Additionally, alternative work that does not provide similar opportunities
for career advancement is not suitable. For example, in Dixon v. City of
Durham,55 the court found that the water meter reader position offered to an
injured police officer was not suitable employment because it did not offer
a similar opportunity for income advancement.56
with the employee.
48. Radica v. Carolina Mills, 113 N.C. App. 440, 447,439 S.E.2d 185, 190 (1994).
49. See Allen v. Roberts Elec. Contractors, 143 N.C. App. 55, 63-64, 546 S.E.2d 133, 13940 (2001) (holding that the employee unjustifiably refused to return to a light duty position
approved by his doctor and therefore allowing the employer to terminate further benefits).
50. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-32.
51. Burwell v. Winn-Dixie Raleigh, Inc., 114 N.C. App. 69, 73,441 S.E.2d 145, 149 (1994).
52. Moore v. Concrete Supply Co., 149 N.C. App. 381, 389-90, 561 S.E.2d 315, 320 (2002).
In Moore, the employer offered Moore, formerly a truck driver, a position as a maintenance
worker. Id. Prior to Moore's injury, there was no such position; various drivers performed the
duties as needed. Id. Because the position was not advertised to the public nor filled after Moore
refused the position, the court concluded that it was make-work. Id. Should the injured
employee be terminated from the make-work position, he would be unable to find a comparable
position and would be left with no income. Peoples v. Cone Mills Corp., 316 N.C. 426, 437-38,
342 S.E.2d 798, 806 (1986).
Thus, a make-work position is not a true indicator of the
employee's earning capacity since the position is not one which is readily available to the injured
employee under normal employment conditions. Id.
53. See Peoples, 316 N.C. at 438, 342 S.E.2d at 806. See also Donna Harrison, N.C. Indus.
Comm'n No. 475328 (Nov. 16, 1999) (holding that modifications made to the position to account
for the employee's fear of heights did not constitute make-work because the modifications
occurred prior to the employee's work related injury) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
54. Moore, 149 N.C. App. at 389-90, 561 S.E.2d at 320-21 (stating that "an employer
cannot avoid its duty to pay compensation by offering the employee a position that could not be
found elsewhere under normally prevailing market conditions").
55. 128 N.C. App. 501,495 S.E.2d 380 (1998).
56. Id. at 503-04, 495 S.E.2d 382-83. Courts have even considered personal factors in
determining whether employment is suitable. In Cialino v. Wal-Mart Stores, the court held that
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When no suitable alternative employment is available, the employer
may provide vocational services to assist the employee in finding work that
is suitable. 7 Vocational rehabilitation has typically been limited to either
helping the employee find a job or vocational skills training. 8 North
Carolina has only recently addressed the issue of whether vocational
rehabilitation also includes formal education. In 2001, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals held, in Russos v. Wheaton Industries,59 that Russos, a
factory employee, was entitled to paralegal training as a type of vocational
rehabilitation service.60 In its findings of fact, the Commission found that
Russos was entitled to temporary total disability until completion of a
paralegal training program at a community college.6' The court left
undisturbed the Commission's finding that, because of the Russos's
permanent five percent disability and her inability to make similar wages in
another job, paralegal training was a "reasonable attempt" at
rehabilitation.6 2 Thus, Russos was not required to seek alternative
employment and her employer was required to pay Russos benefits while
she was in school.63
A year later, in Foster v. U.S. Airways,64 the North Carolina Court of
Appeals held that Foster, who was unable to continue working as a flight
attendant, was entitled to community college tuition as part of her
vocational rehabilitation. 65 Foster had worked for U.S. Airways for eleven
years at an average salary of $35,000.66 While vocational counselors hired
by the employer were actively searching for alternative employment for
Foster, she enrolled as a full-time student at a community college. 67 A
rehabilitation specialist from the North Carolina Department of Vocational
Rehabilitation ("NCDVR") testified that Foster lacked the skills and
education to obtain a job within her physical limitations at a comparable

the plaintiff had justifiably refused a position working a daytime shift since she could not get
childcare. 156 N.C. App. 463,467,577 S.E.2d 345, 354 (2003).
57. See Kathy Foster, N.C. Indus. Comm'n No. 349246 (July 21, 2000) (allowing the
plaintiff education benefits since she was not employable at pre-injury wages in another position)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
58. See supra note 4; see also Snead v. Carolina Pre-Cast Concrete, Inc., 129 N.C. App. 331,
334, 499 S.E.2d 470, 472 (1998) (noting the possibility of allowing the plaintiff to retrain for a
more sedentary position).
59. 145 N.C. App. 164, 551 S.E.2d 456 (2001).
60. Id. at 165, 169, 551 S.E.2d at 457, 460.
61. Id. at 166, 551 S.E.2d at 458.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 149 N.C. App. 913, 563 S.E.2d 235 (2002).
65. Id. at 924, 563 S.E.2d at 238.
66. Id. at 916, 563 S.E.2d at 238.
67. Id. at916-17, 563 S.E.2d at 238.
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salary.68
Arguing that Foster's coursework interfered with her ability to
actively seek employment, the employer sought to suspend disability
benefits.6 9 The Deputy Commissioner refused, but did order Foster to
"comply with the [employer's] vocational rehabilitation efforts ...and to
attempt to locate a (low-paying) job within her restrictions."7 Foster
nevertheless failed to apply for a lower paying position recommended by
the counselor and failed to conduct any job search on her own.71 Again, the
employer sought to terminate benefits-and this time the Special Deputy
Commissioner agreed.72 The Special Deputy Commissioner found that
"[w]hile plaintiff should be encouraged to continue to pursue her education,
she also [had] the responsibility to simultaneously pursue job leads for
suitable and gainful employment, if requested by the defendants, and she
[could not] disregard her affirmative duty to search for employment simply
because she [was] in school."73 The employer appealed, and the Full
Commission reversed concluding that the "rehabilitation plan offered by
the [employer] was not appropriate and the Special Deputy Commissioner
should not have ordered the [employee] to comply with it."74
On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that
placing Foster in a lower paying job was an inappropriate form of
rehabilitation.75 Because the Commission found that Foster was not
capable of making wages comparable to her flight attendant salary, the
court did not require Foster to continue a futile job search in order to
continue receiving benefits.76 Foster was awarded $435.90 per week from
the date that the employer stopped paying.77 However, the court did not
address the extent of benefits to which Foster was entitled; a determination
of this question would have required resolution of related issues including
how long the employer would be required to support Foster's educational
pursuits and which education expenses would be compensable.
The employer, in Foster, was required to pay wage benefits while the
employee pursued an education in her chosen field.78 The goal of
education was to rehabilitate. However, at the time of trial, Foster's
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 916,563 S.E.2d at 238.
Kathy Foster, N.C. Indus. Comm'n No. 349246 (July 21, 2000).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Foster v. U.S. Airways, 149 N.C. App. 913, 924, 563 S.E.2d 235, 242 (2002).
Id.
Id. at 918, 563 S.E.2d at 239.
Id.
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education had not rehabilitated her as evidenced by the fact that she still
was not employable at pre-injury wages.79 The Commission noted in its
findings of fact that even after completing her associates degree in applied
science in the spring of 1997, the rehabilitation specialist from NCDVR
thought that Foster would need additional education to obtain work at her
pre-injury wage.8" Neither the decision of the Commission nor the court of
appeals dealt with this fact.
II. STATUTORY ANALYSIS
Awarding costs of education as a type of vocational rehabilitation is
consistent with North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act. Although the
text of the Act does not expressly include formal education as a type of
vocational rehabilitation, the Act delegates broad authority to the
Commission to make rules for vocational rehabilitation.8 1 Promulgating
rules concerning the costs and duration of education benefits is consistent
with the purpose of the Act, so long the Commission considers employers'
interests in limited liability.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals, in the Foster decision,
attempted to read education into the statutory definition of medical
compensation.82 The Foster court reasoned that education benefits are a
valid form of vocational rehabilitation based on sections 97-25 and 972(19) of the North Carolina General Statutes.83 Section 97-25 requires the
employer to pay medical compensation to the injured employee.' Section
97-2(19) defines medical compensation as:
medical, surgical, hospital, nursing, and rehabilitative services, and
medicines, sick travel, and other treatment, including medical and
surgical supplies, as may reasonably be required to effect a cure or
give relief and for such additional time as, in the judgment of the
Commission, will tend to lessen the period of disability.8 5
Disability is defined based on wage earning potential (rather than
physical incapacity)86 and rehabilitative services are considered medical
compensation (since rehabilitative services are aimed at lessening the
period of disability);8 however, it is difficult to characterize the payment of
79. Id. at 920, 563 S.E.2d at 240.

80. Id.
81. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-25.5 (2003).
82. Foster, 149 N.C. App. at 923-24, 563 S.E.2d at 242.

83. Id.
84. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-25.

85. Id. § 97-2.
86. Dixon v. City of Durham, 128 N.C. App. 501, 504, 495 S.E.2d 380, 383 (1998).
87. Foster, 149 N.C. App. at 923-24, 563 S.E.2d at238-42.
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education expenses as a type of medical compensation. The term
"rehabilitative services" suggests physical rehabilitation to prepare the
body for working.88 Courts interpreting North Carolina's workers'
compensation law should "not enlarge the ordinary meaning of the terms
used by the legislature."89 Yet, courts have repeatedly held that the
workers' compensation statutes should be construed liberally so as not to
deny benefits to an employee.9 °
Alternatively, the Foster court could have based its decision to award
education benefits on section 97-25.5. Section 97-25.5 provides that "[t]he
Commission may adopt utilization rules and guidelines, consistent with this
Article, for vocational rehabilitation services and other types of
In developing the rules and guidelines, the
rehabilitation services.
Commission may consider, among other factors, the practice and treatment
guidelines adopted by professional rehabilitation associations and
organizations.""
Awarding education benefits based upon the Commission's authority
to adopt rules for rehabilitation in section 97-25.5 is more appropriate than
trying to force education into the meaning of medical compensation.
However, courts cannot apply law based on this section until the
Commission has promulgated rules. Thus far, the Commission has not
adopted any specific rules or guidelines pertaining to education benefits
under the Act. The Commission's promulgation of rules under this specific
statutory authorization is the preferable means of legitimizing the award of
educational benefits in North Carolina.92
88. The North Carolina Rules for Utilization of Rehabilitation in Workers' Compensation
Claims provide that:
"Medical rehabilitation" refers to the planning and coordination of health care services.
The goal of medical rehabilitation is to assist in the restoration of injured workers as
nearly as possible to the workers' pre-injury level of physical function. Medical case
management may include but is not limited to case assessment, including a personal
interview with the injured worker; development, implementation and coordination of a
care plan with health care providers and with the worker and family; evaluation of
treatment results; planning for community re-entry; return to work with the employer of
injury and/or referral for further vocational rehabilitations services.
Application of the Rules, N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, r. 10C.0103 (June 2000).
89. Deese v. Southeastern Lawn and Tree Expert Co., 306 N.C. 275, 277, 293 S.E.2d 140,
143 (1982).
90. See Petty v. Transport, Inc., 276 N.C. 417, 415-26, 173 S.E.2d 321, 328 (1970); Hartley
v. N.C. Prison Dep't, 258 N.C. 287, 290-91, 128 S.E.2d 598, 601 (1962); Robertson v. Hagood
Homes, Inc., 160 N.C. App. 137, 143-43, 584 S.E.2d 871, 874-75; Grantham v. Cherry Hosp.,
98 N.C. App. 34, 37, 389 S.E.2d 822, 823 (1990). The Commission's findings of fact are
conclusive while the Commission's statutory interpretation and conclusions of law are subject to
de novo review. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-86.
91. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-25.5.
92. However, clearly delineating the provision of education benefits by rulemaking arguably
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In lieu of any rulemaking effort by the Commission, the General
Assembly should amend section 97-2 to include a specific definition of
vocational rehabilitation that includes formal education as a benefit to
which injured employees may be entitled. 93 Additionally, section 97-25.5
should be amended to include specific limitations on such awards,
including possibly creating a statutorily defined period over which benefits
can last and detailing the costs for which employers would be responsible.
When "[s]tated in unambiguous language, well-defined legislative policy
decisions reduce the need for judicial interpretation and inform potential
claimants of what to expect from the workers' compensation schemes." 94
The amendments proposed above comport with the spirit of the Act,
even though the text of the Act does not explicitly authorize these
benefits. To be fully consistent with the spirit of the Act, the law must
reflect the Act's dual purpose: to compensate employees for work related
injuries and provide employers fixed and limited liability.
The Act was designed to extend protection to workers who are injured
on the job and to force employers to bear the costs of business.96 The
primary focus of the Act is to provide wages to injured employees. For a
number of scheduled injuries and without regard to the fault of the
employer, the Act compensates "a worker for work related injuries which
prevent him from earning the equivalent amount of wages" he was making

would not be in the interest of employees, because setting limits by rule may restrict the provision
of benefits. Given the Commission's generally pro-employee leaning, this argument would
suggest that the Commission would not be interested in promulgating a rule of this kind. See
Isabel B. Loytty, The Fairness Requirement for a Workers' Compensation Agreement-The
Effect of Vernon v. Steven L. Mabe Builders, 17 CAMPBELL L. REv. 521, 531 (1995).
93. However, the lack of a clear statutory basis for education benefits has not prevented the
courts from making these awards. See Foster v. U.S. Airways, 149 N.C. App. 913, 924, 563
S.E.2d 235, 242 (2002).
94. Marc A. Antonetti, Labor Law: Workers' Compensation Statutes and the Recovery of
Emotional Distress Damages in the Absence of Physical Injury, 1990 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 671,
689 (1993).
95. Given that the statutes do not specifically provide for education benefits, we might look
to legislative history to determine the legislature's intended application of sections 97-2(19), 9725 and 97-25.2 of the Act. See Taylor v. J. P. Stevens and Co., 300 N.C. 94, 102, 265 S.E.2d
144, 148-49 (1980). Unfortunately, there is little legislative history on these sections, and their
interpretations by the Commission and the courts to date are not of much help on the question of
education benefits. For example, in Charlotte-MecklenburgHosp. Auth. v. N.C. Indus. Comm'n,
the Supreme Court of North Carolina defined medical compensation broadly based on what gives
relief. See 336 N.C. 200, 218-19, 443 S.E.2d 716, 727-28 (1994) (holding that medical
compensation should "be reasonably required to effect a cure or give relief or tend to lessen the
period of disability").
96. See Vause v. Vause Farm Equip. Co., 233 N.C. 88, 92, 63 S.E.2d 173, 176 (1951)
(stating that "[t]he philosophy of which supports the Workmen's Compensation Act is 'that the
wear and tear of human beings in modern industry should be charged to the industry' ") (quoting
Cox v. Kansas City Ref. Co., 195 P. 863 (Kan. 1921)).
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before his injury in the amount of 66 2/3% of the average weekly wage. 97
These scheduled injuries indicate, at least in part, that the Act is aimed at
providing an efficient and easy method for the injured employee to receive
compensation without regard to any effect on the employee's earning
power.98
The Act was also intended to extend benefits and protection to the
employer.99 It seeks to "ensure a limited and determinate liability for [the]
employer"'" and to promote "uniformity, efficiency, predictability, and
fairness."' 0 ' In addition, section 97-2 was enacted 0under
the 1994 Reform
3
Act, 0 2 as an effort to contain costs to the employer.
Further, the purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act is not to make
the employee significantly better off but rather to compensate the employee
for the injury." Therefore, benefits paid by the employer should only be
to the extent necessary to compensate the employee. This suggests that the
Commission must award benefits that are limited to the amount necessary
for the quickest rehabilitation of the employee.
In sum, North Carolina has chosen to allow education benefits under
the workers' compensation statute; however, the Commission must weigh
the interest of all parties in determining the amount of compensation to
award. 5 In adopting rules under section 97-25.5, the Commission should
be sure to consider the costs to the employer as well as the benefit to the
employee. The employer should be held accountable for the damage
97. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-29, -30 (2003). The Plaintiff needs to show a reduction in
wage earning capacity to receive these benefits. Grant v. Burlington Indus., 77 N.C. App. 241,
250-51, 335 S.E.2d 372, 334 (1985).
98. However, if an employee can show a loss of earning capacity, he is allowed to seek
compensation for his loss of earning capacity rather than proceeding under the scheduled injury
provision of the statute. Knight v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 149 N.C. App. 1, 11-13, 562 S.E.2d
434,442-43 (2002).
99. Winslow v. Carolina Conference Ass'n of Seventh Day Adventists, 211 N.C. 571, 579, 191
S.E. 403, 408 (1937).
100. Barnhardt v. Yellow Cab Co., 266 N.C. 419, 427, 146 S.E.2d 479, 484 (1966).
101. See Gabel, supra note 18, at 1083.
102. Workers' Compensation Reform Act of .1994, ch 679, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 319
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to -122 (2003)).
103. John Richard Owen, Comment, The North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act of
1994: A Step in the Direction of Restoring Balance, 73 N.C. L. REv. 2502, 2506 (1995) (stating
the Reform Act "adjusts the workers' compensation employer-employee balance through changes
designed to contain costs, add flexibility, and streamline administration").
104. In fact, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has said that, "one of the purposes of the
act is to relieve hardship rather than to afford full compensation for injury." Kellams v. Carolina
Metal Prod., Inc., 248 N.C. 199, 203, 102 S.E.2d 841, 844 (1958).
105. This is the method generally used for workers' compensation awards. See Liles v.
Faulkner Neon & Elec. Co., 244 N.C. 653, 657-59, 94 S.E.2d 790, 794 (1956) (holding that all of
the statutory methods for determining average weekly wages must be considered to ascertain
legislative intent that results in a decision that is "fair and just to both parties").
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suffered by the employee, but to comport with the spirit of the Act the
benefits must also be limited.
I. RECOMMENDED REGULATORY GUIDELINES
Since North Carolina allows education benefits, the Commission must
address some issues that were not considered in the Foster case, including
which employees are eligible for benefits, what fields of study they may
pursue, how long benefits should last, what expenses the benefits should
cover, and the reasonableness of the rehabilitation plan for the particular
employee. In addressing these issues the Commission must be mindful of
the fact that the Act was aimed at protecting both employee and employer.
In allowing these benefits, the Commission should require a reasonable
rehabilitation plan, one that assists the employee in moving towards gainful
employment in his chosen field while specifically defining the employer's
liability for continued support of that employee.
A.

Determiningan Employee's Eligibilityfor Education Benefits

To be eligible for any vocational rehabilitation, the employee must
first show that he is disabled within the meaning of the Act. To determine
disability the Commission must ascertain whether any suitable alternative
employment is available for that employee. The determination of suitable
alternative employment is the same whether the employee is requesting
education benefits or traditional vocational services. Only if suitable
employment does not exist is the employee eligible for vocational services.
The Commission has established a priority list for determining the
employee's options for returning to work:
(1) Current job, current employer; (2) New job, current employer;
(3) On-the-job training, current employer; (4) New job, new
employer; (5) On-the-job training, new employer; (6) Formal
vocational training to prepare worker for job with current or new
employer; (7) Due to the high risk of small business failure, selfemployment should be considered only when its feasibility is
documented with reference to worker's aptitudes and training,
06
adequate capitalization, and market conditions.1
106. Application of the Rules, N.C. ADMIN. CODE, tit.4, r. 10C.0103 (June 2000). This
approach is consistent with the approaches other states have adopted. For example, in North
Dakota the goal of the Workers' Compensation Statutes is "to return the disabled worker to
substantial gainful employment with a minimum of retraining, as soon as possible after the injury
occurs." N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-01 (2003). New Mexico's statute similarly provides that
"vocational rehabilitation services are those services designed to return the employee to gainful
employment, in the following priority: (1) pre-injury job with the same employer; (2) modified
work with the same employer; (3) job related to former employment; or (4) suitable employment
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When a case comes before the Commission, it first should make a
finding of fact on whether suitable alternative employment in one of the
first five categories above is available to the employee. Application of the
list ensures that the employer is not asked to bear the cost of retraining
when suitable alternative employment is available.
Although application of the priority list appears to be relatively clear,
courts have applied it haphazardly; reaching different decisions as to
suitable alternative employment in cases involving essentially the same
The inconsistencies in determining suitable alternative
facts. 07
employment are not specific to situations in which the employee is seeking
education benefits. However, the consequence of these inconsistencies is
more significant in those situations because the costs to the employer, when
are greater than those associated with traditional
education is awarded,
10 8
services.
vocational
Nebraska's priority system,"° which is similar to North Carolina's,
was not applied at all in Heironymus v. Jacobsen Transfer."' In
Heironymus the Nebraska Supreme Court allowed the employee, a former
truck driver, vocational rehabilitation even though there was evidence that
she also had experience in bookkeeping, retail sales, auto mechanics, and
production work."' It was not clear that the injury prevented the employee
from working in any of these areas in a new job with a new employer." 2
The court's decision in Heironymus effectively placed the burden on the
employer to prove that the employee was not disabled." 3
When asking the court for education benefits, the employee should
bear the burden of proving that he is not presently able to obtain any
suitable employment." 4 If the employee is employable, he should be
in a nonrelated work field." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-3-17 (1978).
107. See infra notes 115-25 and accompanying text.

108. See Section nI.B.
109. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-162.01 (2004) ("The priorities are listed in order from lower
to higher priority: (a) return to the previous job with the same employer; (b) modification of the
previous job with the same employer; (c) a new job with the same employer; (d) a job with a new
employer; or (e) a period of formal retraining which is designed to lead to employment in another
career field").
110. 337 N.W.2d 769 (Neb. 1983).
111. Id. at 771-72.
112. The court's explanation for allowing the employee education in spite of her other job
experience was that "[tihere [was] no showing that the plaintiff could do bookkeeping for anyone
except her husband or that she could perform such services without help." Id. at 771.
113. In North Carolina, if the employee is not seeking compensation for a scheduled injury
(either because his injury is not a scheduled injury or because he thinks that he can collect more
under an alternate remedy) then the plaintiff bears the initial burden of providing that he is
disabled. See Russell v. Lowes Prod. Dist., 108 N.C. App. 762, 765, 425 S.E.2d 454, 457 (1993).
114. This seems to be what is required under the Russell test. Id. To guard against false
claims, the court should require clear and convincing proof. See Mack v. Cerro Copper Tube and
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required to accept a position, thus terminating further obligation on the part
of the employer, If the employee chooses not to work in any of the fields
in which he was already trained, the employee himself should bear the
costs associated with education for a new line of work. This result is
consistent with the aims of the Act. It protects the employer with limited
liability. It further prevents employees from taking advantage of the
system by getting an education at the expense of employers when they
decide to move into an entirely new line of work following an injury." 5
In cases such as Foster, where it is evident that the employee cannot
make the same wages in a different job due to lack of education or
experience," 6 the quickest method for returning the employee to pre-injury
wages may be an education. If it is indeed the fastest method of
rehabilitation, then courts should allow the employee to go to school
without requiring any further job search. This benefits both the employee,
by allowing him to pursue an education, and the employer since the
quickest method for rehabilitation will lessen the period over which the
employer will have to pay benefits.
Thus, the Commission and the courts must be able to draw a fine line
between employees who can find suitable alternative employment and
those who have no other option but education. In Ward v. Floors
Perfect,"7 the employee suffered knee problems as a result of his job
installing flooring." 8 The court held that the employee did not make a
sufficient showing that he was unable to find suitable alternative
employment and therefore did not consider him disabled.'
The court
concluded that he voluntarily removed himself from the workforce and was
not entitled to further benefits. 20
It is difficult to reconcile Ward, where the employee was deemed to
have voluntarily withdrawn from the job market, with Foster. In Foster,
the employee could not obtain similar wages because of the high salary
level she obtained and her limited education credentials.' 2 ' In Ward, the
employee had spent most of his adult life working in flooring and only had
passed the General Education Development (GED) test.'22
The
Constitution State Servs. Co., 37,319 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/25/03), 850 So. 2d 1005, writ denied,
2003-2607 (La. 12/12/03), 860 So. 2d 1157.
115. This is not to say that the employee would not receive compensation for the injury. To
the contrary, the employee might also be entitled to wage benefits during the time he is in school.
116. Kathy Foster, N.C. Indus. Comm'n No. 349246 (Feb. 8, 2001).
117. No. COA01-568, 2002 WL 1791348 (N.C. App. Aug. 6, 2002).
118. Id. at *1.
119. Id. at *5-*6.
120. Id. at *7.
121. Foster v. U.S. Airways, 149 N.C. App. 913, 917-27,563 S.E.2d 235, 238-44.
122. David Ward, N.C. Indus. Comm'n No. 816964 (Feb. 8, 2001) (on file with the North

20041

WORKERS' COMP 101

2077

Commission emphasized the fact that the employee in Ward had not
actually sought alternative employment; 123 however, neither had the
employee in Foster. 4 The Commission in Ward seems to base its
decision, at least in part, on its subjective determination that the employee
was intelligent and articulate. 25 The Court of Appeals, with deference to
the Commission's findings, agreed that Ward was able to procure
12 6
alternative employment and thus not entitled to education benefits.
Ward is not much help in establishing criteria to determine generally
when an employee is voluntarily withdrawing from the workforce and
when an employee has no suitable alternative employment options. To
some degree this determination must be a subjective one. Factors like the
employee's mental capacity cannot be precisely measured but are certainly
considered in determining employment opportunities. 2 7 However, an
objective determination of the injured worker's employability in the
marketplace must also be made. By making the determination of whether
there is suitable alternative employment a subjective and objective
determination, the Commission and the courts can comply with the purpose
of the Act. The objective components ensure that awards are fair and
predictable and protect employers from having to pay benefits to
employees who can work.
The Commission should also consider refining the type of objective
criteria used in the determination. As a preliminary matter, it seems
necessary that the employee conduct a job search, even if brief and
fruitless, either on his own or with the assistance of vocational specialists.
Further, the vocational counselors working with the employee should guide
the determination,2 8 though it is likely that both parties will have
Carolina Law Review).
123. Id. A Deputy Commissioner recently awarded the employee in Ward total disability
compensation due to his inability to obtain employment at his pre-injury wage despite reasonable
attempts to do so. David Ward, N.C. Indus. Comm'n No. 816964 (Aug. 9, 2004) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
124. Foster,149 N.C. App. at 917, 563 S.E.2d at 238.
125. Ward, 2002 WL 1791348, at *7. In their findings of fact, the Commission noted that
"[a]s demonstrated at the hearing, Plaintiff is intelligent and articulate and should do well in
pursuing his education." Ward, N.C. Indus. Comm'n No. 816964. One of the peculiar facts of
this case was that Ward was actually a self-employed small business owner. Id. This may have
contributed to the court's finding that Ward was employable; however, it is unclear that someone
experienced in the flooring business could transfer those skills into developing another business
in which he was physically capable of performing.
126. Ward, 2002 WL 1791348, at *7-8.
127. Id. See also Bridges v. Linn-Corriher Corp., 90 N.C. App. 397, 400, 368 S.E.2d 388,
391 (1988) (noting the plaintiff's age and education as factors in considering employability).
128. The court of appeals "has approved the use of testimony by vocational rehabilitation
specialists on the issue of wage earning capacity" and therefore disability. Kennedy v. Duke
Univ. Med. Ctr., 101 N.C. App. 24, 31, 398 S.E.2d 677, 681 (1990). The court also noted that
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vocational experts who agree with their position.' 29 These specialists have
the knowledge and experience to make a determination as to employability
that the Commission and the courts may not.
The Commission must also consider what happens when the employee
is presently employable in another position at comparable wages but does
not have the same opportunity for advancement as he did in his prior
employment. That was exactly the case in Dixon. 3 ' In that case, the court
held that to be considered suitable alternative employment, the employee
must have the equivalent potential for income advancement.
Similarly, in Muckler v. Valassis Communications, Inc.13 the
Commission awarded benefits even though the employee was offered a
position with the defendant that paid the same wages. 3 2 The employee was
133
a high school graduate making $12.16 as a warehouse material handler.
Prior to the injury, he had hoped to move into higher paying positions
within the company.' The court held that, since the proffered position did
not afford the same opportunity for income advancement, it was not
suitable alternative employment and the employee was entitled to
vocational rehabilitation compensation for his educational pursuits. 35
Mere aspiration to higher wages is not sufficient to justify the added
cost to the employer. 36 In cases like Dixon, the court has stretched the
definition of disability to allow benefits even when the employee is
presently capable of making pre-injury wages.'37 An employee like
Muckler, who is not disabled, should not be entitled to education benefits
when he is presently employable at pre-injury wages. 38 Courts should not
further strain the workers' compensation scheme by requiring the employer
pay additional education benefits under an equally stressed definition of
medical compensation. 3
North Carolina courts and the Industrial
testimony of the plaintiff himself may be adequate proof of disability. Id.
129. See Foster, 149 N.C. App. at 916, 563 S.E.2d at 238 (stating that the plaintiff's
vocational counselor found that the plaintiff needed an education to reach the same pay level
while the defendant's vocational counselor actively pursued job prospects for the plaintiff).
130. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
131. Travis Muckler, N.C. Indus. Comm'n No. 950747 (Sept. 9, 2003) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See Dixon v. City of Durham, 128 N.C. App. 501, 504-05, 495 S.E.2d 380, 383 (1998)
(finding that the employee was entitled to education benefits because as a meter reader she would
not be eligible for pay raises that she would have been eligible for in her previous position).
137. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
138. Travis Muckler, N.C. Indus. Comm'n No. 950747 (Sept. 9, 2003) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
139. Medical compensation is limited to compensation "that may be reasonably
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Commission should reject such outcomes. 140 In serving the dual purposes
of the Act, education benefits should not be awarded when the employee is
presently employable at pre-injury wages.
However, education benefits may be justified if it is highly probable
that the employee would have achieved higher wages in his pre-injury
position. In Dixon, the court looked at the pay increases the employee
could receive in a position as meter reader. The Commission found that,
although the employee would be given the same wage in the meter reader
position, she would start at the top of the pay scale for that position and
would be frozen out of any pay increases she might have received if she
was allowed to continue working in her pre-injury position as a police
officer.' In Muckler, the Commission's analysis seems to go a step too far
by basing its decision about income advancement not on the potential
advancement in the pre-injury position, but on the employee's aspiration
for higher paying positions.'4 2 There was no assurance that the employee
would meet his career goals.143 Income potential is a factor in determining
whether suitable alternative employment exists. However, to justify the
additional cost to the employer, the consideration of income potential
should be based on a substantial likelihood that the employee will reach the
higher income level in the pre-injury employment, not in any position that
he may have wished to obtain.
B.

Fields of Study an Employee is Allowed To Pursue

Once it is determined that the employee is eligible for education
benefits, the Commission should then require the employee to submit a
plan for rehabilitation. The plan should first address the type of education
the employee is pursuing. The employer is likely to argue for a form of
education that puts the employee back into comparable employment as
quickly as possible so as to limit the employer's expense. While there
should be some limitation to the areas of study the employee may pursue,
the aptitudes and preferences of the employee should be given some
consideration.
required ...to lessen the period of disability." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(19). But see Foster v.
U.S. Airways, 148 N.C. App. 913, 923-34, 563 S.E.2d 235, 238-42 (2002) (allowing education
benefits under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2).
140. But see Foster, 148 N.C. App. at 923-34, 563 S.E.2d at 238-42 (2002) (allowing
education benefits under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2).
141. Dixon, 128 N.C. App. at 383, 495 S.E.2d at 504-05.
142. Muckler, N.C. Indus. Comm'n No. 950747. Significant, though, is that the Commission
noted that the income advancement potential of the proffered position was not comparable to the
income advancement potential of the employee's pre-injury position. Id.
143. In fact, the employee had recently moved from Iowa, where he had been attending
community college, and had only worked for the defendant for six months. Id.
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Though the employee should be allowed to choose his field of study,
an employer should not be forced to fund an employee's career change
unless necessary. In Doyle v. Spangler Bros., Inc.,' the Idaho Supreme
Court upheld the Commission's denial of a benefit award to an employee
who sought to return to school.'4 5 Since the employee could not establish
that he needed retraining in order to restore his earning capacity, the
Commission did not obligate the employer to pay benefits so that the
employee could change his occupation via an education.'46
In Murphy v. Duke City Pizza, Inc., 47 the employee suffered severe
injuries to her left hand in a motor vehicle accident and could no longer
work.'48 She sought and was awarded benefits to pursue a degree in
mathematics. 49 On appeal by the employer, the New Mexico Court of
Appeals concluded that the employee should not have received benefits
under the New Mexico statute.5 0 The statute provided that, "if a worker is
unable to perform the pre-injury job or modified work with the same
employer, the worker is entitled to vocational rehabilitation benefits that
enable her to perform a job related to her former employment or suitable
employment in a non-related field.''
Mathematics was not related to
pizza delivery and thus the rehabilitation program was not compensable
until the worker showed that she could not obtain work in a related field.' 52
By forcing the employee to remain in the same field, the period of
disability should be shorter and thus the burden on the employer should be
less. This limitation strikes a fair balance between allowing the employee
to get an education while limiting the costs to the employer. However,
forcing the injured employee into an occupation not of his own choosing is
unreasonable, 53 not to mention potentially wasteful should the employee
choose not to work in that field. When the employee must find a new
career because of his injury, his options should not be limited to his prior
occupation.
If forced into a related field just to receive education benefits, the
employee may not recapture his lost earning capacity if he ultimately

144. 718 P.2d 1195 (Idaho 1986).
145. Id. at 1195-96.
146. Id.
147. 881 P.2d 706 (N.M. App. 1994).
148. Id. at 708.
149. Id. at 711.
150. Id.
151. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-50 (1978) (repealed by 1990 N.M. Laws ch. 2, § 151).
152. Id.
153. See, e.g., Kepler v. Mirza, 102 F. Supp. 2d 617, 624 (W.D. Pa. 1999) (noting the liberty
interest in pursuing one's occupation of choice is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment).
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chooses not to work in that field.154 North Carolina allows for a suspension
of benefits when the employee does not cooperate with rehabilitation
efforts.' 55 If benefits can be suspended for non-cooperation and noncooperation is more likely when the employee is forced into a field of
study,' 56 then it becomes more likely that the employee will be stripped of
the benefit the court has decided that he deserved. The court should limit
the duration of the benefit to only the period necessary so as to lessen the
expense to the employer. However, the court must balance this with the
need to allow the employee to pursue any field of study that will not
present an additional expense to the employer.
Similarly, courts may also look at the chosen course of study not only
to determine the duration of the proposed rehabilitation but also to
determine whether it is suitable to the individual employee. Minnesota law
requires that the Workers' Compensation Board, as opposed to the
Department of Vocational Rehabilitation, consider the propriety of the
course of study. 5 7 Minnesota courts analyze the "suitability of the course
selected in light of the employee's intelligence, education, and physical
condition."'5 8
The Nebraska Supreme Court in Pollock v. Monfort of Colorado,
59
Inc.
considered many of the same factors in determining the
appropriateness of the employee's chosen field of study. 160 The court
considered the fact that the employee, who was hoping to pursue an
associate degree in mechanical drafting, had a GED and was deficient in
math but had an aptitude for drafting. 6' The court analyzed the employee's
154. Nebraska courts require that any vocational rehabilitation be in the best interest of the
employee. Pollock v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 381 N.W.2d 154, 155 (Neb. 1986). Factors courts
consider in determining the employee's best interest include "education, employment history, and
permanent functional impairment." Overshiner v. Simon Contractors and Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
Doc: 197 No: 2146, 2000 WL 489031, *2 (Neb. Work. Comp. Ct. Apr. 20, 2000). It is difficult
to argue that any field of study is in the employee's best interest if it is not a field in which the
employee is interested in working.
155. See N.C.GEN.STAT. § 97-25 (2003) (stating that the "refusal of the employee to accept
any medical ... or other treatment of rehabilitation procedure when ordered by the Commission"
may lead to suspension of benefits). See also Deskins v. Ithaca Indus., 131 N.C. App. 826, 82930, 509 S.E.2d 232, 234 (1998) (holding suspension unwarranted when there is a lack of evidence
that the employee refused any rehabilitation, but simply requested a change in treating physician).
156. See generally Scurlock v. Durham County Gen. Hosp., 136 N.C. App. 144, 145-46, 523
S.E.2d 439, 441 (1999) (noting the plaintiff's refusal to "apply for jobs and her intentional poor
performance in interviews"); Swain v. C & N Evans Trucking Co., Inc., 126 N.C. App. 332, 337,
484 S.E.2d 845, 849 (1997) (stating that the plaintiff did not cooperate with rehabilitation efforts
even after the Commission ordered him to do so).
157. Anderson v. Pilot City Health Ctr., 239 N.W.2d 227, 229 (Minn. 1976).
158. Id. at 228.
159. 381 N.W.2d 154 (Neb. 1986).
160. Id. at 154-55.
161. Id.
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immediate and potential wages in the field. 62 However, the court denied
compensation for the cost of education, based primarily on the employee's
physical limitations.163 The employee's injury involved the loss of four
fingers on his left hand. Based on evidence of increased use of computers
in the field, the court reasoned that the employee's injury would prevent
him from meeting the future requirements of the field.1" Though the
employee's intelligence and education certainly factor into how well the
employee will perform educationally, physical considerations were equally
important in Pollock in determining the employee's employment potential
upon completion of his education.
Another consideration of primary importance is whether the employee
will be employable upon completion of his rehabilitation program. Since
the goal of rehabilitation is to return the employee to pre-injury wages,
some states require the employee to show that there are job opportunities
within the field of study. In Kurtenbach v. Frito-Lay,'65 when the
employee could no longer perform his job as a route salesman, he sought to
obtain a degree in metallurgical engineering. 66 The South Dakota Supreme
Court denied benefits for the rehabilitation plan since the employee could
not show that the plan was reasonable.'6 7 There were few, if any, job
opportunities in metallurgy in the employee's community.' 68
The North Dakota Supreme Court used a similar analysis to determine
whether the employee's chosen course of study would render him
employable.'69 The court granted employee education benefits based in
part on a labor market survey showing that there is a reasonable
expectation of employment within the employee's physical limitations and
salary range. 7
Montana has also found employment prospects to be of primary
162. Id. at 155.

163. Id.
164. Id. Today, there are many ways a person with a physical disability like Pollock can
effectively use a computer. Pollock today could be aided by the use of a one-handed keyboard or

an eye-gaze system, which allows users to control a computer with eye movements. See, e.g.,
Infogrip, Inc., at http://www.onehandkeyboard.com (marketing and selling "products that
provide people with a healthier and more productive way to interact with computers") (last visited
Aug. 17, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
165. 1997 SD 66, 563 N.W.2d 869 (S.D. 1997).
166. Id. at 871-72.
167. Id. at 875.

168. Id. The court could not consider the fact that the employee was willing to move.
Willingness to relocate is irrelevant under South Dakota law, which requires that reasonableness
be established by the availability of positions in that community. Id. The court would not allow
the employee to look outside his current area for alternative employment when the employer was

also limited in geographic scope.
169. Thompson v. N.D. Workers' Comp. Bureau, 490 N.W.2d 248, 254-55 (N.D. 1992).
170. Id.
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importance when determining whether a rehabilitation plan is reasonable.
In Reeves v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 7' the Montana Supreme
Court held that the employee's plan to obtain a master's degree in
counseling was not reasonable rehabilitation. 17 2 Though the court felt
assured of her success in the program based on her intellectual capacity, it
did not feel the plan was reasonable rehabilitation because it would not put
her in a better position in the job market.'73 Since the goal of rehabilitation
is to restore the employee to pre-injury wages, the court should only
approve forms of education that are likely to accomplish this result. This
was also an issue in Foster. The vocational rehabilitation specialists noted
that Foster was not employable at pre-injury wages even after completing
an associate degree in applied science.'74 North Carolina courts should
require the employee to show that allowing education benefits is a
reasonable attempt at rehabilitation by showing that he is likely to find
employment at pre-injury wages upon completion of the chosen education
program.
Finally, there may be public policy concerns about the chosen field of
study. In Towne v. Bates File Co.,'75 the employee sought compensation
for costs associated with enrolling in a professional gambler's school in
Nevada. 76 The employee was planning on returning to Florida to work on
a cruise ship where gambling is allowed. While this may be acceptable in
Florida, it is not likely that a North Carolina business would look favorably
on paying for an employee to go to gambler's school.' 77
The Commission should develop guidelines for determining what
educational goals an employee may pursue. Initially, there may be some
forms of education, such as gambling school, that the Commission will not
consider to be valid.'78 The employee should be required to submit a plan
for education rehabilitation for consideration by the employer and
ultimately approval by the commission.' 79 If the field of study has been
171. 911 P.2d839 (Mont. 1996).
172. Id. at 842.
173. Id. According to testimony from the plaintiff's rehabilitation counselor, the plaintiff
could make the same wages with a bachelor's degree. Id.
174. Kathy Foster, N.C. Indus. Comm'n No. 349246 (July 21, 2000).
175. 532 So. 2d 65 (Fla. App. 1988).

176. Id. at 66.
177. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-292 (2003) (stating that "any person or organization that
operates any game of chance or any person who plays at or bets on any game of chance at which
any money, property or other thing of value is bet, whether the same be in stake or not, shall be

guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor")..
178. See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
179. See Bixenmann v. H. Kehm Constr., 676 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Neb. 2004) (stating that "an
injured employee may not undertake rehabilitation on his or her own and receive temporary total
disability benefits without approval from either the court or his or her former employer").
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deemed to be generally appropriate, then the Commission must determine
whether it is appropriate for that particular employee. The Commission
must consider the likelihood that the employee will be successful in
pursuing that goal.1 81 In making this determination the Commission should
The
consider the employee's prior education and mental abilities.
Commission should also place significant weight on the employee's
employment prospects.1 81 Vocational experts and market surveys should
assist the Commission in its assessment of the employee's employability. 82
C.

Durationof an Employer's Liabilityfor an Employee's Education

Once the court has awarded education benefits, there is also the issue
of how long the employer must pay those benefits. The employee may
hope to pursue a two year degree, four year degree, or just enough to make
him employable.'83 The court's award should address this issue. In
Muckler, the Commission failed to address the issue of duration. At the
time of the injury, the employee was working as a warehouse material
handler."8
The Commission awarded the employee "vocational
rehabilitation compensation for educational pursuits, including a college
education." '85 In failing to specify how "educational pursuits" is defined,
the Commission has offered no guidance for future cases nor has it even
completely settled the dispute between these parties as to what
compensation the employee will receive.
Some states have opted for a statutorily defined period of vocational
rehabilitation. 86
Other states have let the workers' compensation
commission define the appropriate time frame. In North Dakota, the
Workers' Compensation Bureau has determined that it will only award two
180. See supra notes 156-62; 171-73.
181. See supra notes 164-68.
182. The opinions of vocational experts guided the court's decision in Reeves. See Reeves v.
Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 911 P.2d 839, 841-42 (Mont. 1996). But see N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 521-25 to -26 (1978) (stating that the "workers' compensation judge shall not receive or consider
the testimony of a vocational rehabilitation provider offered for the purpose of determining the
existence or extent of disability").
183. Employees have even sought reimbursement of expenses associated with obtaining a
master's degree. In Peabody v. Home Ins. Co., the plaintiff was ironically a vocational
rehabilitation specialist when she injured her back. 751 A.2d 783, 784 (Vt. 2000). She sought
compensation for cost incurred in pursuing a master's degree in counseling. Id. The court held
that she must show she was not employable at pre-injury wages of $37,500. Id at 787.
184. Travis Muckler, N.C. Indus. Comm'n No. 950747 (Sept. 9, 2003).
185. Id.
186. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.710 (Mitchie 2003) (limiting vocational training and
service to 52 weeks except in unusual cases); Mclnnis v. Town of Bar Harbor, 387 A.2d 739, 741
(Me. 1978) (stating the benefits could only extend for up to fifty-two weeks plus an additional
fifty-two weeks if the court deemed it necessary for full rehabilitation according to the state's

workers' compensation statute).
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years of benefits as a general rule. 18 7 While these methods provide easy to
apply standards that assure little subjectivity in decisionmaking, they may
not lead to effective rehabilitation since age, experience and previous
education are also factors in determining what rehabilitation is appropriate
and how long it will take.
Other states strictly limit the time the employee may spend in school
based on the minimum time necessary for rehabilitation. In Chiolis v. Lage
Development Co.,88 the South Dakota Supreme Court would not allow the
employee compensation for costs to get a four-year degree when a two-year
degree would restore the employee to gainful employment. 8 9 The court
stated that rehabilitation is not for the purpose of elevating the employee's
station in life. 9° The court "must not lose sight of the fact that the
employer has a stake in the case [because] the employer is required to
'underwrite' the expenses of rehabilitation."' 9'
While awarding education benefits only in the amount necessary to
rehabilitate the employee is a legitimate limitation that comports with the
purpose of workers' compensation statutes, the Chiolis court took the
restriction too far. The court did not allow the employee to recover any
education costs since he was enrolled in a four-year program even though
he was only seeking to recover for two years worth of expenses. 92 While
the employer should only have to pay the costs required for rehabilitation,
the employee should be allowed to choose his field of study even though he
may not be fully reimbursed for the costs.'

93

The employee who was

forced into a new occupation should be allowed to choose the field of study
regardless of its duration but should only be compensated for the education
necessary to restore the employee to gainful employment.
Further, the courts must require some type of rehabilitation plan, as it
failed to do in Muckler, so that both parties clearly know what can be
expected. Yeargin v. Daniel International94 clearly illustrates the problems
that can occur when the court does not define the extent of its award. The
employee in Yeargin, formerly a welder, initially studied construction, and
187. Levey v. N.D. Workers' Comp. Bureau, 425 N.W.2d 376, 377 (N.D. 1988).
188. 512 N.W.2d 158 (S.D. 1994).
189. Id. at 160-61.
190. Id. at 161.
191. Id. See also Irwin v. Contemporary Woodcrafts, Inc., No. 0416-99-4, 1999 WL
1134729, at *1 (Va. App., Dec. 7, 1999) (holding that the court should consider the costs to the
employer and the benefits to the employee when determining the appropriateness of a proposed
rehabilitation program).
192. Id. at 164. (Sabers, J., dissenting). In another sarcastic dissent, Judge Henderson notes
that the plaintiff is not trying to elevate himself but is only trying to stay off welfare. Id.
193. See e.g., Kepler v. Mirza, 102 F. Supp. 2d 617, 624 (W.D. Pa. 1999) (noting the
plaintiff's right to pursue the occupation of his choice).
194. 384 S.E.2d 114 (Va. App. 1989).
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then changed her focus to engineering. 95 She finally settled on working
toward a bachelor's degree in business administration. 9 6 The Virginia
Court of Appeals held that she was not entitled to receive benefits for this
type of general education since the economic benefits she would receive
are too speculative.' 97 The court can prevent this type of problem by
clearly defining the rehabilitation plan for the employee at the outset. The
employer will have the benefit of a definitive duration of payments and the
employee will know that for which he is being compensated. 'The plan
should be structured so that the employer will terminate benefits after the
minimum period for rehabilitation, even if the employee is not yet
employed at pre-injury wages.
D. Education-RelatedExpensesfor Which an Employer is Liable
When education is awarded, the employer must often bear the costs of
tuition, books, and other fees associated with the program.' 9 However,
under New Mexico statutes the employer is also required to pay for (1)
lodging, travel and other expenses, and (2) maintenance of the employee's
family. Compensation for these additional expenses is not to exceed
$3,000.'9 The New Mexico Court of Appeals, in Garcia v. Schneider,
awarded the employee amounts for moving and travel expenses.0 0
Additionally, the court held there was no limitation on the amount spent for
the actual vocational rehabilitation service other than that it must be
reasonable.2 °'
Nebraska statutes similarly provide for reasonable costs to be paid by
the employer if the employee must travel away from home for an
education. 0 2 If the injured employee had accepted alternative employment
instead of education that required the employee to travel away from home
for work, the employer would not responsible for those additional travel
expenses.0 3 While this may seem unfair, the employee may only be able to
take advantage of the educational opportunity if the employer covers these
195. Id. at 115.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 116. The court held the benefits were speculative because the worker did not
present evidence regarding wage potential and likelihood of finding employment with this degree.

Id.
198. See Pinkston v. Teletronics, Inc., 4 S.W.3d 130, 132 (Ky. 1990); Arnstrom v. Excalibur
Cable Communication, Ltd., 790 A.2d 764, 771 (Md. App. 2002); Garcia v. Schneider, Inc., 731
P.2d 377, 378 (N.M. App. 1986); Diversified Rubber v. Harvey, 74 P.3d 619, 621 (Okla. Civ.
App. 2003).
199. Garcia,731 P.2d at 378.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 380.
202. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-162.01(4) (2003).
203. See N.M. STAT. Ann. § 52-1-56 (1978).
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costs. If the court deems the employee to have a right to education benefits
it would be absurd not to provide enough compensation to allow the
employee to utilize the benefit. While this is an additional cost, in a sense,
the employer is only paying the full costs associated with engaging in a
business that puts some risks on its employees.
Alternatively, a California court has limited the costs the employer has
to pay. In Niedle v. WC.A.B., 14 the employee was injured while working
in California but subsequently moved to Nevada.2 5 The parties agreed that
she would obtain a teaching certificate, but the California employer refused
to pay the extra $637 that it would cost to obtain the certificate in
Nevada.2 °6 The court held that the employer was not required to pay these
additional costs. The California statutes specifically prohibit an out-ofstate rehabilitation plan unless it is more cost effective. 7 North Carolina
should consider adopting a similar rule, because it gives the employee the
opportunity to be fully rehabilitated in a field of his choosing while
controlling costs to the employer.
E.

Reasonableness of a Proposed RehabilitationPlan

The employee seeking rehabilitation benefits should present a plan for
rehabilitation to the employer and the Commission. Today, in North
Carolina workers' compensation cases, it is typically the employer's
rehabilitation counselor who determines the plan for the employee's
rehabilitation. 8 The counselor can represent the employer's interest by
making sure the plan achieves the quickest method of rehabilitation.
However, the employee should have considerable influence in determining
the type of rehabilitation since the employee's cooperation with the
rehabilitation program is essential to its success."° Since it has already
been determined that the employee has no opportunity for suitable
employment, he should be allowed to direct his educational goals, to the
extent that allowing the employee some discretion is compatible with

204. 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 534 (Cal. App. 2001).
205. Id. at 537.
206. Id.
207. CAL. LAB. CODE § 4 6 44(g) (2003).
208. See Walker v. Lake Rim Lawn & Garden, 155 N.C. App. 709, 712, 575 S.E.2d 764, 766
(2003) (stating that the defendant assigned the plaintiffs vocational rehabilitation counselors);
Foster v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 142 N.C. App. 913, 917, 563 S.E.2d 235, 238 (2002) (stating that a
vocational rehabilitation counselor hired by the defendant told the plaintiff to conduct a job
search after the plaintiff requested that she be allowed to pursue an education).
209. North Carolina allows suspension of benefits, but not termination, if the employee fails
to cooperate with vocational rehabilitation. Scurlock v. Durham County Gen. Hosp., 136 N.C.
App. 144, 145-46, 523 S.E.2d 439, 441 (1999). Once the employee shows that he is willing to
cooperate, benefits may be reinstated by the court. Id. at 150-52, 523 S.E.2d at 443-44.
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limiting the liability of the employer.
The employee should bear the burden of proving that the rehabilitation
plan is reasonable.2 1 ° In determining whether the plan is reasonable, the
court should look at the relative costs and benefits of the plan to both
employer and employee.2 ' Factors to consider include the employee's
intelligence, prior education, and experience. 1 2 These indicators are
helpful, though not determinative, in predicting whether the employee will
be successful in the chosen field of study." 3 Determining the employee's
likely success in the field will necessarily be a subjective finding of fact
and thus substantial deference should be given to the Commission's
findings. 4
Additionally, the Commission should consider the employee's
physical abilities, which might impact the employee's success in the field
of study, and his hopes for employment upon completion of the
rehabilitation plan. If the employee cannot physically perform in the
occupation or does not want to work in the field, the Commission should
not approve that field of study for the employee's rehabilitation plan.215
Finally, in awarding education benefits, the Commission should
consider the employee's dedication to other rehabilitation programs. 2 6 The
Commission and courts will be responsible for planning and monitoring an
employee's progress. Failure on the part of the employee to make diligent
efforts toward the education goals defined by the rehabilitation plan should
result in the termination of benefits.21 7
While an award and a rehabilitation plan serve the employer's interest
by defining the liability, they should not be completely rigid. An award by
210. Kurtenbach v. Frito-Lay, 1997 SD 66, 563 N.W.2d 869, 875 (S.D. 1997).
211. See Irwin v. Contemporary Woodcrafts, Inc., No. 0416-99-4, 1999 WL 1134729, at *1
(Va. App. Dec. 7, 1999).
212. See Bryant v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 130 N.C. App. 135, 138, 502 S.E.2d 58, 61 (1998)
(holding that the rehabilitation plan was unreasonable because the employee was incapable of
completing the plan due to mental illness resulting from her work related injury).
213. See supra Section III.B.
214. The Commission is responsible for the initial finding of fact; the appellate court only
determines, whether there was competent evidence to support that finding. Hendrix v. LinnCorriher Corp., 317 N.C. 179, 186, 345 S.E.2d 374, 379 (1986).
215. See Yeargin v. Daniel Int'l, 384 S.E.2d 114, 115 (Va. App. 1989) (stating that the
plaintiff had to change her field of study once she learned her knee injury would prevent her from
pursuing a career in construction).
216. See Warburton v. M & D Constr. Co., 498 N.W.2d 611, 614 (Neb. Ct. App. 1993). See
also Anderson v. Pilot City Health Ctr., 239 N.W.2d 227, 229 (Minn. 1976) (holding that the
compensation board should have admitted evidence of the employee's failure in the first portion
of the retraining program and remanding to the board for a final determination on benefits).
217. See Behrens v. Am. Stores Packing Co., 421 N.W.2d 12, 18 (Neb. 1988) (affirming
lower court's finding that the employee must diligently pursue the agreed upon education plan or
the court will suspend disability benefits).
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the court should not be final, but subject to modification as necessary.2t8
Modification should only be allowed based on a substantial change in the
conditions related to the compensable injury. 1 9 In Dougherty v. SwiftEckrich, Inc.,220 the Nebraska Supreme Court denied the employer's
request for modification because there was no evidence of any increase in
incapacity due to the initial injury. 22 ' By limiting modification only to
situations where the injury is the cause of the changed circumstance, the
court can prevent spurious claims. An employee who is not truly interested
in being rehabilitated cannot extend the period of benefits by simply not
performing in his educational pursuits or changing his field of study.
Upon completion of the approved plan, the employer will have
fulfilled his obligation to the employee. The court should only allow the
plan if it is expected to rehabilitate the employee.222 Payments will be
terminated because the rehabilitation plan should be presumed to have fully
restored the employee's wage earning capacity. Even if the employee is
not employed at pre-injury wages this may be due to other factors outside
of the parties' control.223
CONCLUSION
The legislature should adopt a statute specifically addressing
education benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act. The statute
should define any broad limitations on awards including the duration of
benefits, what expenses the employer is required to cover, and any other
limitation it may choose to impose. These overarching concerns should be
defined by elected officials rather than the Industrial Commission. The
legislature has chosen to define these limitations with respect to workers'
compensation generally and is the appropriate body to address issues
specific to educational benefits. 24
218. See Thompson v. N.D. Workers' Comp. Bureau, 490 N.W.2d 248, 256 (N.D. 1992)
(Meschke, J. concurring).
219. This is the standard used in North Carolina for other workers' compensation awards.
Pomeroy v. Tanner Masonry, 151 N.C. App. 171, 179, 565 S.E.2d 209, 215 (2002).
220. 557 N.W.2d 31, 32-33 (Neb. 1996). The court held that although the length of time the
employee would need to complete the course work was miscalculated due to failure to consider
the employees' reading deficiencies, the employee was not entitled to a modification of benefits.
221. Id. at 32-33.
222. See supra notes 210-16 and accompanying text. For the employee to prove the
rehabilitation plan is reasonable, there must be an expectation that the employee will complete it
and return to employment at pre-injury wages.
223. See Evans v. Am. Cmty. Stores, 385 N.W.2d 91, 93 (Neb. 1986) (affirming the
compensation court's holding that the plaintiff's inability to find a job was largely due to the
economy and cut backs at his place of employment).
224. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-29 (amount of weekly compensation for total
incapacity); Id. § 97-30 (amount of weekly compensation for partial incapacity); Id. § 97-31
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The legislature has vested the Industrial Commission with the
discretion to fashion specific rules for vocational rehabilitation 'and other
types of rehabilitation services. 25 As more and more cases like Foster,
Russos, and Ward arise, the courts and Commission need to have standards
in place to prevent arbitrary decisionmaking, to the extent possible. 226 To
receive education benefits, the employee must prove that he has no suitable
alternative employment prospects, that the rehabilitation is necessary to
restore the employee to gainful employment, and that the employee's
proposed rehabilitation plan is a reasonable method for returning the
employee to gainful employment. 2 7
To prove that he is unable to work at his previous employment or at an
alternative for which he is qualified, the employee must prove he is not
capable of obtaining suitable employment at an equivalent wage.228
Showing that the education is a necessary method of rehabilitation is
subjective in nature. The Commission should be required to make specific
findings of fact regarding the employee's physical and mental capacity that
make him a suitable candidate for education benefits.2 29 If the proposed
plan of rehabilitation is suitable the court must consider the factors of age,
physical and mental capacity, and previous experience, education and
training, and employment prospects. 3 °
Education benefits are a viable alternative for employees who are
(schedule of compensation and rates of compensation for injury ranging from loss of thumb to
permanent damage to important organ).
225. Id. § 97-25.5. The court of appeals has stated "what treatment is appropriate for a
particular employee is a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission." Neal v.
Carolina Mgmt., 130 N.C. App. 228, 234, 502 S.E.2d 424, 429 (1998).
226. These guidelines should be promulgated by the Commission under section 97-25.5. If
the Commission does not act in this area, the court of appeals has already demonstrated in Foster,
Ward, and Russos that it is willing to make the rules as cases arise.
227. This is a modified formulation of the test used by South Dakota courts applied in Cozine
v. Midwest Coast Transp., Inc., 454 N.W.2d 548, 553 (S.D. 1990). This is also similar to the test
developed in Jaramillo v. Consol. Freightways, 790 P.2d 509, 513 (N.M. App. 1990). That cases
states that the employee must prove (1) that he is unable to perform work at which he has some
previous training or experience, (2) that he is a proper candidate for the requested rehabilitation,
and (3) that it is likely that the rehabilitation will end the period of disability. Id.
228. See Nichols v. Teledyne Econ. Dev. Co., 707 P.2d 1203, 1204 (N.M. App. 1985).
229. In a New Mexico case, the court awarded rehabilitation services to the employee stating
only "[w]e have reviewed the evidence and conclude that the plaintiff is entitled to rehabilitation
services." Trujillo v. Beaty Elec. Co., 577 P.2d 431, 437 (N.M. App. 1978). This gives the
workers' compensation board in the state no guidance as to what factors are important in
determining the suitability of the rehabilitation to future plaintiffs and leaves a lot of room for
arbitrary decisionmaking. However, New Mexico's statute gives greater guidance to the courts.
See Madrid v. St. Joseph Hosp., 1996-NMSC-064, 928 P.2d 250, 255 (N.M. 1996) (stating that
the judge is to apply a statutory formula, "which incorporates the worker's impairment rating,
age, education, and residual physical capacity in order to arrive at a disability rating, which
determines the level of benefits available").
230. See Anderson v. Pilot City Health Ctr., 239 N.W.2d 227, 228 (Minn. 1976).
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rendered unemployable by a work related injury. As North Carolina courts
begin to allow employees these benefits, courts should have in place
guidelines to achieve consistent and fair decisions. These rules should
force the employer to bear the costs of retraining employees who are
injured while working for the employer and therefore can no longer
perform their job. However, the rules should also establish limits on
benefits. The workers' compensation system was also intended for the
benefit of the employer and he should not be required to bear the costs of
educating every injured employee. Employees should receive only the
benefits needed to restore them to gainful employment at pre-injury wages.
This result is fair to injured employees as well as employers and thus serves
the purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act.
MEGAN E. MILLER

